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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Bally's concurs with Francia's assessment that this Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) 1953, 
as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this brief are: 
1. May Francia raise issues before this Court he failed to 
raise before the trial court? 
2. Is Francia's failure to respond to a Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion as required by Rule 56(e) fatal 
to his opposition of the motion and to his appeal? 
3. Are the exculpatory provisions of the agreement 
sufficiently specific to be enforced? 
4. Is the agreement void as against public policy? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Because Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment 
are appropriately granted only as a matter of law, appellate 
courts accord no deference to the trial court's determinations 
and review the issues under a correctness standard. K & T, Inc. 
v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994). 
Because Francia suggested to the trial court its 
interpretation of the contract should turn on what he intended, 
this Court should review aspects of this appeal pertaining to 
interpretation of the contract under the clearly-erroneous 
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standard. Trail Aft. Coal Co. v. Utah Div. Of State Lands & 
Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265 (Utah App. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The law relevant to the disposition of this appeal is set 
forth within the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from and order granting Bally's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Francia filed suit claiming he was injured when employees of 
Bally's failed to properly assist him as he participated in a 
weight lifting contest at Bally's spa. Record at 1. Bally's 
moved to dismiss Francia's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and attached the Affidavit of an 
employee of Bally's with a copy of Francia's Membership 
Application. Record at 23. 
Francia filed his memorandum in opposition but no affidavit 
or other supporting documents were filed with Francia's 
memorandum. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on the 
grounds that the actions, or inaction, of which Francia 
complained were specifically waived and released by the 
Membership Agreement. Record at 70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Francia raises the law stated in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. 
of Calif., 60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963) for 
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the first time on appeal. He also specifically argues the 
Membership Agreement is a contract of adhesion for the first time 
on appeal. Where these issues were not raised before the trial 
court, they may not be raised on appeal. 
Bally's motion was supported by an affidavit. Francia 
responded to the motion without any supporting affidavit or other 
documentation. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
requires such supplementation. Francia's failure to meet the 
requirements of Rule 56 (e) was fatal to his response before the 
trial court and fatal to his appeal. 
Utah law allows exculpatory contracts if they are 
appropriately drawn to specify the covered behavior. By the 
Membership Agreement, Francia waived his right to sue for "our 
negligent instruction or supervision" which negligence for the 
factual basis for his claims as pled in his Complaint. 
Even if this court were to adopt the analysis of Tunkl v. 
Regents of Univ. of Calif., supra, Bally's health spa is not a 
public servant. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
FRANCIA MAY NOT RAISE NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant's (Francia) Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant/Appellee's (Bally's) Motion to Dismiss filed with the 
trial court consisted of six pages of argument of substantive 
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law. Record at 29. The points he raised were 1) the exculpatory 
clause was void as against public policy, and 2) alternative 
theories of liability avoided dismissal of his claims. He has 
not raised the alternative theories point in this appeal. 
Francia's public policy argument constituted three and one-
half pages of his memorandum in the trial court. Record at 31-
34. He cited Union Pacific Railroad Co. ve El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965), which is discussed hereafter, for 
the general proposition exculpatory clauses were always void in 
Utah as against public policy. He then cited other cases from 
other jurisdictions for the propositions that; 1) inconspicuous 
exculpatory language was not effective, and 2) general 
exculpatory language was not effective. No where within 
Francia's memorandum was there mention of the contract being one 
of adhesion. 
In point one of his brief before this Court, Francia argues 
his Membership Agreement with Bally's is void as a contract of 
adhesion. This point is supported by citations to 16 different 
cases, none of which were cited to the trial court. While 
Francia alleges unequal bargaining power once in his memorandum 
before the trial court, no where in that memorandum does he argue 
the Membership Agreement is a contract of adhesion. Superior 
bargaining power is only one element of an adhesion contract. 
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Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763, 766 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
An argument will be deemed to have been raised before the 
trial court if the trial court had an opportunity to enter 
findings of fact and/or conclusions of law. James v. Preston, 
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). There must be a "factual 
showing or . . . submission of legal authority" before the 
argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court 
level, id. Further, the trial court must address an argument 
before it may be considered on appeal. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 
1993) . 
Even when this Court liberally construes Francia's 
memorandum before the trial court, it cannot reach the conclusion 
that he argued, before that court, that the Membership Agreement 
was a contract of adhesion or that the six elements of Tunkl v. 
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 
Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963) applied. Because these issues are raised for 
the first time on appeal, they may not be considered by this 
Court. 
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II 
FRANCIA FAILED TO RAISE ISSUES OF FACT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a party 
to move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted." Rule 12(b) provides: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to 
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
Bally's moved to dismiss Francia's Complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) and attached the Affidavit of Sandra Harrington, an 
employee of Bally's. Record at 23. Harrington's Affidavit 
reported on its face that she was competent to testify to the 
matters stated in the Affidavit, and that the document attached 
to the Affidavit, Francia's Membership Application with Bally's, 
was a true and correct copy of that document, and that Harrington 
was a custodian of the membership record. Under Rule 12(b), the 
affidavit altered the nature of the motion to one which is 
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In response, Francia filed his Memorandum with five (5) 
numbered paragraphs identified as "Statement of Facts". Record 
at 29. These statements did not cite any supporting affidavit, 
deposition, answers to interrogatories or admissions which would 
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make them "facts." No affidavit was filed with Francia's reply 
memorandum. There was no verification which would allow the 
Memorandum to substitute for an affidavit. The Memorandum itself 
was not signed by Francia. 
Rule 56 provides: 
When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits, or as 
otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for 
Trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. Rule 56(e), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; see also Watkiss and 
Campbell v. Foa and Son, 808 P.2d 1061 Utah (1991). 
Accordingly, the only "facts" which the trial court could 
consider in addressing the motion were those contained in Sandra 
Harrington's affidavit and the agreement attached to it. 
Rule 56 is augmented by Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Rule 4-501(1)(a) provides: 
All motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or 
citations by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. 
Despite the requirements of both Rule 56 and Rule 4-501, 
Francia's Memorandum was not accompanied by affidavits, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, etc. The use of 
responsive affidavits is mandatory where the moving party has 
presented affidavits or other facts which would require the 
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granting of its motion. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
Thereafter, the court issued a Minute Entry granting 
Bally's# Motion to Dismiss, Record at 68, and entered an order 
elucidating the reasons therefor pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Record at 70. 
Utah case law supports the interpretation of Rules 12 and 
56, cited above, requiring the dismissal of Francia's appeal. In 
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, 8 94 P.2d 1270, 
1277 (Utah App. 1995), the court addressed similar issues: 
Despite asserting each of these defenses in its answer, 
Hygro has not presented any evidence to support them. 
'In resisting a Motion for Summary Judgment, bare 
contentions, unsupported by any specifications of fact 
in support thereof, raise no material questions of 
fact.' First Sec. Fin. vs. Okland Ltd., 750 P.2d 195, 
197 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Brigham Trucking 
Implement Co. v. Fridle, 146 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 
1987) (per curium). As a party opposing the Bank's 
properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment, Hygro 
'had an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or 
other materials allowed by Rule 56 (e) [of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure].' Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, 
Inc., 847 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Hygro simply did 
not meet its burden by presenting some evidence, by 
affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of 
material fact with respect to any of these defenses. 
Because Ballys filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion supported by 
affidavits, that motion should have been treated and was treated 
as a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment by the trial court. As 
a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, Francia was obligated to 
provide affidavits or other supporting material appropriately 
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delineated in Rule 56 to support his position with regards to the 
motion. Having failed to do so, the trial court was entitled to 
and correctly did grant summary judgment. Francia's failure to 
file affidavits was fatal to his action below and is fatal to 
appeal. This defect alone requires that the appeal be dismissed. 
Ill 
THE EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IS NOT VOID 
In opposing Bally's' Motion, Francia asserted the 
exculpatory clause was "in much smaller print" and was not 
bargained for by Francia. Record at 30. Even the most cursory 
review of the contract shows that in actual fact, provisions of 
Paragraph Ten were in exactly the same size type face as the 
majority of the language on the front page of the agreement and 
that the last two sentences in Paragraph Ten were printed in bold 
type face and provide, "You acknowledge that you have carefully 
read this waiver and release and fully understand that it is a 
release of liability. You are waiving any right to bring a legal 
action to assert a claim for our negligence." Not only was the 
release language of Paragraph Ten not smaller than the rest of 
the agreement, it was virtually the only information, not 
required by Federal or State law, which was printed in bold. 
Additionally, no affidavit was filed to show the terms were "not 
bargained for". 
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Francia's suggestion in his "Statement of Facts" that the 
waiver and release provision was not bargained for was not 
supported by anything he filed to support his position when 
responding to the motion. 
In addition to reading the provisions of Paragraph Ten as 
suggest by Bally's, the trial court, in making its ruling, noted 
additional language calling Francia's attention to the fact that 
he was waiving certain rights under the contract. Immediately 
above Francia's signature on the front page of the agreement was 
the following language. Record at 68. "WAIVER AND RELEASE: 
This contract contains a WAIVER AND RELEASE in Paragraph 10 to 
which you will be bound." [emphasis in the original] 
Francia cited Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965) for the proposition that 
exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy. That was 
not the holding of El Paso Natural Gas. El Paso Natural Gas is 
in fact the case which governed the disposition of Bally's 
motion, but required the dismissal of Francia's case. In El Paso 
Natural Gas, this Court upheld the denial of the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on exculpatory language which 
would have required El Paso Natural Gas to indemnify Union 
Pacific and hold it harmless: 
. . . from and against any and all liability, loss, 
damage, claims . . . of whatsoever nature . . . growing 
out of injury or harm to, or death of persons 
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whomsoever, or loss or destruction of, or damage to 
property whatsoever, including the pipe line, when such 
injury, harm, death, loss, destruction or damage, 
howsoever caused, grows out of, or arises from, the 
bursting of or leaks in the pipeline, or in any other 
way whatsoever is due to or arises because of the 
existence of the pipeline where the construction, 
operation, maintenance, repair, renewal, 
reconstruction, or use of the pipeline or any part 
thereof, or the contents therein or therefrom." Id. at 
912 [emphasis in the original.] 
In discussing exculpatory clauses in El Paso Natural Gas, 
this Court did not hold such clauses are void but only "the law 
does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve 
himself of the basic duty which law imposes. . .", Id. at 913. 
While the law does not favor exculpatory clauses, there are 
situations where they will be upheld. 
This court described some of those situations. 
The majority rule appears to be that in most situations, 
where such is the desire of the parties, and it is clearly 
understood and expressed, such a covenant will be upheld. 
That the presumption is against such an intention, and it is 
not achieved by inference or implication from general 
language such as was employed here. It will be regarded as 
a binding contractual obligation only when that intention is 
clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
If it had been the intent of the parties that the 
Defendant should indemnify the Plaintiff even against 
the latter's negligent acts, it would have been easy 
enough to use that very language and to thus make that 
intent clear and unmistakable which was not done here. 
Id. at 914. 
While that was not done in El Paso Natural Gas, it was done 
by Bally's. Paragraph Ten includes the following language: 
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This waiver and release of liability includes, without 
limitation, injuries which may occur as a result of 
(a) your use of any exercise equipment or facilities 
which may malfunction or break, (b) our improper 
maintenance of any exercise equipment or facilities, 
(c) our negligent instruction or supervision, and 
(d) you slipping and falling while in the Health Club 
or on the premises. 
Additionally, Francia's attention was specifically drawn to the 
waiver and release language of Paragraph Ten by the bold type 
immediately above his signature line on the first page of the 
agreement. 
The only factual allegations of Francia's Complaint 
addressing any departure from a duty Bally's allegedly owed 
Francia were that Bally's failed to properly train and/or 
supervise the spotters who assisted in the weight lifting 
contest. The language of Paragraph Ten specifically addresses 
and then waives and releases liability pertaining to negligent 
training or supervision. To paraphrase El Paso Natural Gas, "it 
was easy enough to use that very language and to thus make that 
intent clear. . ." Id. at 914. 
In El Paso Natural Gas, this Court noted the Defendant had 
to stretch the language of the release to reach the conclusion 
that the injuries for which indemnification was sought were 
covered by the agreement. The court felt that "the fair import 
of the entire provision . . . is that the damage is guaranteed 
against some causal connection with the construction, existence, 
C \IN\BRIEF 12 
maintenance, or operation of the pipeline other than an incident 
which happened merely coincidental with existence." Id. at 914. 
In the current matter, the claims being waived and released by 
Paragraph Ten were exactly the variety of claims Francia sought 
to assert. 
The clear reading of El Paso Natural Gas is that while 
exculpatory agreements may not be favored, they will be upheld if 
appropriately drawn. An appropriately drawn exculpatory 
agreement, which relieves a party of liability for its own 
negligence, must specify the negligent action or inactions for 
which the party will not be liable. The waiver and release 
language of the Membership Agreement specified Bally's would not 
be liable for failure to train or supervise. This language is 
sufficiently narrow to be enforced. The agreement is not void 
because it is too broad or too vague and is enforceable to 
exclude the claims Francia asserted in before the trial court. 
IV 
TUNKL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT 
Francia argues this Court should apply the law of Tunkl v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 
Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963), in this matter. The Tunkl analysis was 
created by the California Supreme Court to determine whether a 
contract with a given entity is subject to stricter public policy 
scrutiny because the entity is a public servant. 
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The Tunkl criteria, paraphrased from Francia's brief, are; 
1) does the agreement concern an endeavor of a type generally 
thought suitable for public regulation, 2) is the party seeking 
exculpation performing a service of great importance to the 
public, 3) is the party seeking exculpation willing to perform 
its service of any member of the public who seeks it, 4) is there 
a decisive economic advantage because of the essential nature of 
the service, 5) is there no provision in the contract for 
purchasing protection from negligence, and 6) the person seeking 
the services must be placed under the control of the furnisher of 
services. 
Tunkl was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in Russ v. 
Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1996). In Russ, 
the entity seeking to be exculpated was a home builder. There 
the Court of Appeals said: 
In our view, it is clear that Woodside is not a 
public servant. Traditionally, public servants are 
state agencies, utilities, innkeepers, common carriers, 
and public warehousers. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 445 n.12, 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 33 (Cal. 1963). Public servants are those who 
are duty bound to contract with all comers. While 
Woodside does contract with some home buyers, it has no 
obligation to contract with every home buyer. Public 
servants are persons and entities that provide 
essential and indispensable services such as hospital 
care and police protection. See id. at 447 (discussing 
essential nature of hospital services); Schrier v. 
Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 533 A.2d 1316, 1323 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (contrasting alarm company's 
services with essential nature of police services). 
Woodside's service of building houses for private 
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parties cannot be described as an essential public 
service. Consequently, Woodside is not a public 
servant. 
A 
NO FACTS SUPPORT TUNKL 
A Tunkl analysis would require the trial court to consider 
facts and make findings of fact and reach conclusions of law. To 
perform this analysis, the court would need to hear testimony or, 
in the case of a motion for summary judgment, have submitted to 
it affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories. Since no 
such support was provided, no issue of fact allows the court to 
make a Tunkl analysis. 
Even if the court were to decide a Tunkl analysis could be 
made as a matter of law, Bally's submits this Court could take 
judicial notice of the fact that Bally's services would not meet 
any element of the six conjunctive Tunkl criteria. 
B 
TUNKL WAS NOT RAISED BELOW 
Finally, this Court may not consider whether the Bally's 
Membership Agreement meets the elements of the Tunkl analysis. 
The Tunkl issue not raised before the trial court and may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal for the reasons stated 
above. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bally's Motion to Dismiss was treated as a Rule 56 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Francia allowed the trial court to rely on 
the language on the face of the Membership Agreement when he 
failed to submit affidavits. The trial court reviewed the 
agreement and correctly ruled it specifically and narrowly 
described the types of negligence for which Bally's would not be 
held liable. The Motion to Dismiss was appropriately granted. 
Francia now asks this Court to examine the agreement under a 
completely different analysis than that he presented to the trial 
court. Since these issues are raised for the first time on 
appeal, the court may not consider them. 
This court should dismiss Francia's appeal and grant Bally's 
its costs. ^ 
DATED this Q day of April, 1996 
Robert H. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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